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1. Introduction
The well-being of immigrant youth – of the first or second generation - is intimately tied
up with their socio-economic status and success; in turn, their success and how immigrant
youth relate to the society around them are important elements of social cohesion and
well-being for those societies. Institutional settings, in relation to immigrants and to
Welfare State structures more broadly, as well as the policies adopted within those
settings, vary greatly from one developed country to the next. This opens up the potential
for studying key outcomes for immigrant youth in a comparative perspective, and
learning about which settings and policies appear to be more versus less effective in
promoting their well-being and capitalizing on their potential.
This paper sets out a framework for such an analytical exercise, drawing on recent
research and monitoring efforts in the related areas of multidimensional well-being,
social inclusion/exclusion, and child well-being. It then seeks to place some key findings
from the disparate social science research literature on immigration and youth
(principally drawing on economics and sociology) within that framework. This serves to
bring out both the potential and the difficulties associated with this approach to teasing
out “what works” for immigrant youth. In conclusion, the paper points to the major gaps
in knowledge and what is required to make progress in learning from disparate country
experiences about how best to promote the well-being on immigrant youth.
2. Coverage and Definition
What precisely is meant by “immigrant youth” needs discussion before one can proceed.
Migration involves moving from one place to another, but does that have to involve
crossing an international border, or is internal migration – for example from rural to
urban - to be included? The broader scope that goes with inclusion of internal migration
comes at a very real cost in terms of difficulties in focus and coherence, as well as major
measurement and empirical challenges, so a strictly cross-border focus has major
advantages and is the one adopted here. The next issue is whether the individuals2
concerned must have migrated from one country to another themselves, or whether those
born in the country of current residence but whose parents (or grandparents) migrated are
to be included. This again depends on the issues one wants to address, and second-
generation immigrants are explicitly included in the scope of this conference. How such
immigrants are defined and measured then matters: having one parent who has migrated
is the approach employed in the conference concept paper and in much of the empirical
research on the topic, but for some purposes one might want to restrict the focus to where
both parents have migrated. Finally, “youth” is also a somewhat imprecise term, denoting
those between childhood and full maturity but captured crudely by looking at those in a
specific age range; in addition, in examining the well-being and potential of immigrant
youth it will be important to incorporate both earlier circumstances in childhood and later
outcomes in adulthood.
Having defined the broad group of interest, it may also be useful to note some distinct
sub-groups across which the key policy concerns might differ. These might include, for
example, such categories as:
 Youth who have migrated legally with parent/parents;
 Illegal undetected migrant youth
 Illegal migrant youth in detention
 Youth who have migrated without family, legally and willingly;
 Youth who have migrated without family illegally
 Youth who have migrated without family unwillingly – i.e., been trafficked.
3. Capturing Well-being
To be able to properly assess the well-being of immigrant youth, one needs a clear
conceptual underpinning and empirical framework, setting out what one means by well-
being and its core dimensions. There is now a substantial body of research, activity and
data which focuses on capturing and monitoring well-being in developed countries,
including on a cross-country comparative basis. A great deal can be learned from these
exercises in terms of identifying the key dimensions of well-being, what it has proved
possible to monitor for the general population and for specific groups such as children,3
and the uses to which the output have been put. This can provide a general framework
within which to set the assessment of the situation of immigrant youth, supplemented by
specific features or aspects of particular relevance for that group.
This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the concept of well-being, but some
important features about how it is generally now employed in such monitoring exercises
may be noted. First, the focus on well-being is seen as moving beyond narrow or one-
dimensional views of the human personality or of socio-economic circumstances towards
a many-sided and more encompassing view, which identifies a number of dimensions
that are key to a rounded human life. (It is recognized that such concepts of human well-
being are culturally relative and essentially normative in character). Secondly, as well as
reflecting resources and living conditions, a central element is now seen to be the extent
to which people are enabled, as far as possible, to attain their own ends. This reflects for
example the focus in Swedish welfare research on ‘level of living’ (see for example
Erikson and Aberg, 1987). Level of living is defined in terms of access to resources in the
form of money, possessions, knowledge, mental and physical energy and social
relationships, through which an individual can control and consciously direct his living
conditions. This represents a very substantial broadening beyond purely economic
resources to include knowledge and skills, and also goes beyond resources alone to
include essential conditions such as health, quality of work environment or amenities in
the home are important for an individual’s well-being. The core notion is that it is not
simply outcomes that matter – because these can be affected by the different choices
people make – but rather the capacity to affect those outcomes in a purposive way.
This has much in common with Sen’s influential concept of “capabilities” (see Sen 1993,
Erikson (1993). Sen defines functionings as the various things a person manages to do or
be in leading a life - such as being adequately nourished and in good health, having self-
respect and being socially integrated, and their capability then reflects the alternative
combination of functionings he or she can achieve. It is freedom or ability to achieve
rather than simply outcomes that we care about:4
“If our paramount interest is in the lives that people can lead – then it cannot
but be a mistake to concentrate exclusively only on one or other of the means
to such freedom. We must look at impoverished lives and not just depleted
wallets” (Sen, 2000:3).
While empirically ‘capabilities’ has proved to be an elusive concept, the emphasis on the
processes linking resources and outcomes, the concern with the manner in which
outcomes combine to constitute particular life-styles, and the emphasis on empowerment,
freedom and expansion of choice are important contributions. So to is the emphasis on
the fact that individuals are not atomized, their lives are intertwined with others in their
household, community and beyond, and the nature of those relationships, and the
institutions and policies in place, are fundamental influences on wellbeing.
Well-being then reflects not only living conditions and control over resources across the
full spectrum of life domains, but also the ways in which people respond and feel about
their life in those domains. Research on “quality of life” (developing from the 1960s
principally in the USA, (see for example Campbell et al 1976) has concentrated very
much on subjective well-being as the focus of interest, relying for the most part on
responses to questions asking people to evaluate their own conditions. This research
draws heavily on psychology and social psychology, and distinguishes for example
between happiness and life satisfaction, the former being seen as more of an affective
state whereas the latter represents more of a cognitive state (see for example McKennel
and Andrews, 1980). More broadly, though, both objective and subjective aspects and
indicators are generally incorporated into efforts to monitor wellbeing.
While different studies and statistical systems use different categorizations of domains or
dimensions of wellbeing, there is a reasonably high degree of overlap or commonality
between them. Fahey, Nolan and Whelan’s (2003) review for the European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, which underpinned subsequent5
surveys on the quality of life in Europe, concluded that the dimensions commonly
employed
1 included:
 Employment and working conditions
 Economic resources
 Knowledge, education and training
 Health and health care
 Families and households
 Community life and social participation
 Housing
 Local environment and amenities
 Transport
 Public safety and crime
 Recreation and leisure activities
 Culture and identity, political resources and human rights
It is also worth noting the core dimensions employed in studies and monitoring exercises
focused specifically on the wellbeing of children and youth (on which see Ben-Arieh et
al., 2001, Ben-Arieh and Frones eds., 2009). For example, the study by Bradshaw and
colleagues for UNICEF (2007) bringing together data for 21 developed countries on 40
separate indicators identified six core dimensions of well-being for children and youth:
 material deprivation,
 health and safety,
 education,
 family and peer relationships,
 behaviour/lifestyles and risks, and
 subjective well-being.
In the USA, since 1997 the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics
(building on Hauser, Brown and Prosser, eds. 1997) publishes an annual report on the
1 Examples discussed in detail included the Swedish welfare tradition, German social accounts, UK Social
Trends, and the New Zealand Social Report.6
well-being of children and families, in which the indicators are organized into the
following sections:
 Family and Social Environment,
 Economic Circumstances,
 Health Care,




Another of broad outcome domains used in the USA (see Hair et al, 2001) and focused
on youth distinguishes educational achievement and cognitive attainment, health and
safety, social and emotional development, and self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is
broadly defined to include economic, social, and personal elements, and its inclusion
brings out the importance of trying to capture not only wellbeing in the present but also
prospects for the future. It is also worth noting a tendency for measures of child well-
being to focus more on negative outcomes and problems, behaviors that adults wish to
prevent, rather than positive development and outcomes (see for example Moore,
Lippman and Brown, 2004), and also that there are generally far more measures available
in the educational and health/safety domains than in the social and emotional domain.
Learning from Diversity
Institutional settings, in relation to immigrants and to Welfare State structures more
broadly, as well as the policies adopted within those settings, vary greatly from one
developed country to the next. This opens up the potential for studying key outcomes for
immigrant youth in a comparative perspective, and learning about which settings and
policies appear to be more versus less effective in promoting their well-being and
capitalizing on their potential. This is the standard way economists, sociologists and
social policy analysts try to learn about “what works” for groups regarded as
“vulnerable” in our societies – for children, older people, those with disabilities etc. It is a
challenging enterprise in general, but even more so when applied to immigrants as a
vulnerable group, for reasons that are worth teasing out.7
To be able to assess which institutional settings and policies are most effective, we need
to look at how similar immigrants fare in different countries, but all too often the
information available does not allow this to be done satisfactorily. As Heath and Cheung
(2007) make clear, such comparative investigation, to be reliable, requires standardised
analyses using nationally representative samples, standardised coding of variables, and
standardised statistical models. Identifying migrants in the first place is often
problematic, with differences in practice from one country to the next in how this is done
– and, importantly, an unwillingness in some countries (notably France) to distinguish
second-generation migrants in standard statistical instruments. The outcome variables of
interest must also be measured in a comparable fashion, which can be problematic when
making comparisons across for example different education systems or with inadequate
information on income, occupation or indicators of broader well-being. Finally and
crucially, the heterogeneity of the immigrant population itself needs to be taken into
account: a wealth of reliable, truly comparable information about them and their
background is needed if we are to be able to measure how immigrants do compared to
natives with the same characteristics, and how truly “similar” immigrants fare in different
countries. Capturing social background in order to filter out its effects is a challenge in
dealing with any population, but for both first and second-generation immigrants it is
particularly problematic.
2
Abstracting from these difficulties, given satisfactory measures of key outcomes and
individual and background characteristics, teasing out the role of institutions and policies
in producing observed differences across countries is far from straightforward. Even
focusing on one country, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of a specific institutional
structure or policy innovation from broader economic and social trends, and to be sure
that changes in the composition of the immigrant population are not what is driving
observed changes in outcomes. (Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are becoming
2 For first-generation immigrants, education or social class position relative to others in their country of
origin, as well as destination, may be relevant. For the second generation, their parents may not have
achieved a social class position that reflects their education or aspirations for their children, so social class
of origin may not mean the same as it would for others.8
fashionable in the social sciences and may play a useful role, but are generally
informative about specific interventions rather than broader social structures.) Even if we
are fairly sure that a particular policy measure or intervention has “worked” in improving
outcomes for immigrant youth in a particular setting, it can be hazardous to generalise, in
that it might be less successful elsewhere in a different institutional context and to what
may be a rather different immigrant group.
The comparative perspective also opens up the potential for alternative perspectives on
what we mean by “doing well”. The obvious and common approach to investigating how
immigrants or ethnic minorities are doing in a particular society is to compare their
situation with others there in terms of what are regarded as key outcomes – in relation to
education, employment, living standards, health etc. Measuring what is often called the
“immigrant/ethnic penalty” in this way is clearly central, but the question “do immigrants
do better in country A versus B” could also be approached in a different way, against
some common standard – in which country do immigrants attain higher levels of
education, income or health on average? Apart from anything else, this might be an
important factor in the way a potential migrant thinks about their options (where both the
average standard of living available and the probability of reaching or exceeding it should
influence the choice of destination). For the second generation, by contrast, it may be the
host country rather than the country of origin or potential alternative destinations that
provides the main frame of reference in evaluating their own well-being. From a policy
perspective the primary focus is also on supporting and facilitating immigrants to do well
compared with others in the country in question, but the broader question remains in the
background in thinking about migration more generally.
We now go on to focus on some of the key dimensions of well-being for migrant youth,
starting with education and going on to discuss the labour market, economic
resources/poverty, health, housing, and social integration and cohesion.9
Education
Educational attainment is a key determinant of subsequent earnings and occupational
attainment, and differences in educational outcomes across social classes and income
groups have been intensively investigated by sociologists and economists for many years.
Explanations for the major differences observed (in all Western societies) generally focus
on the different costs and benefits in progressing through the education system facing
families at different points in the income distribution or class hierarchy, and cultural
factors such as familiarity with the system and what it demands of students. This is also
an area where a substantial body of research has been done on the position of migrants,
both first-generation and second-generation. This serves to bring out both the importance
of the “traditional” explanations for relatively poor outcomes when applied to migrants,
and the need to go beyond them.
This can be seen when considering the position of both first and second-generation
migrants. Among the first generation - and here we are thinking of those who migrate and
enter the education system of the host country – a high proportion may face both
structural and cultural deficits. The occupation and family income of their parents may be
low, their parents will be unfamiliar with both the education system and probably the
broader cultural setting, and the children/youth themselves may have to learn the
language. For the second generation, born in the host country of immigrant parents, those
parents are on average still disadvantaged in the labour market and thus in income and
class terms – as discussed below. Although language acquisition may be much less of an
issue than for the first generation, their parent’s lack of exposure to the educational
system, and perhaps broader cultural dissonance, may still represent significant
handicaps.
The key analytical challenges that must be faced in seeking to apply those standard
frameworks, and in trying to identify “what works” for immigrant youth via comparative
research, are highlighted in a set of co-ordinated country studies of ethnic inequalities in
educational attainment among the children of migrants who came to Europe and North
America in the second half of the 20
th. century, who are now completing their education10
and entering the labour market. Many, but by no means all, these migrants come from
less-developed countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa or Mexico as migrant
workers. The country studies
3 provide a wealth of information about the educational
attainment of the second generation, and all have information that allows them to
examine simultaneously ethnic origins and social background.
4
Some clear patterns emerge across the countries. There are large overall differences
between ethnic groups before taking account of there socioeconomic background, with a
number having substantially lower educational attainment than the majority groups in the
country, with some others doing less badly but still lagging behind the majority, and with
a few out-performing the majority group. When the socio-economic position of the
parental generation (in terms of occupation, income, and/or education) is taken into
account, this is sufficient to explain the educational outcomes for many of the groups
studied – notably those of European ancestry. Among those from developing countries,
educational disadvantage sometimes exceeds that predicted by parental socioeconomic
position, but the results differ from country to country and group to group – for example,
in Germany social background explains all the Turkish disadvantage in obtaining the
Arbitur on completing second-level as well as the North African disadvantage in test
scores in France, whereas it explains only half the Mexican disadvantage in high-school
graduation in the USA and little of the disadvantage in exam performance of boys of
Caribbean origin in Britain.
The conclusion reached is that traditional explanations emphasizing social background
work rather well in explaining ethnic minority disadvantage, and that parental
socioeconomic status stratifies ethnic groups in much the same way as majority groups.
5
3 The countries (and ethnic groups) covered include Belgium (Turksish, Moroccan and Italian ancestry),
England and Wales (Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani), France (North African and Portuguese), Germany,
(Turkish, Italian, Yugoslav, Greek, Spanish/Portuguese), the Netherlands (Moroccan, Turkish and
Surinamese/Antillean ancestry), Norway (Turkish, Pakistani and Indian) and Sweden (Turkish, Chiean,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Finnish, East Asian). More limited results are also included for the USA (Hispanic).
4 Initial findings were brought together in a set of papers in Ethnicities in 2007, with an overview by
Brinbaum and Heath (2007), and more recent results are summarised in the presentation by Heath (2009)..
5 Difficulties in properly capturing parental background for the second generation must be noted, since for
example occupational status or position in the income distribution in the host country may not reflect that in
the country of origin.11
However, where they do not suffice, several additional factors specific to migrants may
be at work. Cultural dissonance, such as the lack of required cultural capital and limited
parental language fluency, may affect children’s school performance. Van de Werfhorst
and van Tubergen’s (2007) findings for the Netherlands show that parental cultural
resources (such as usage of the Dutch language and knowledge of the educational
system) are positively associated with test scores.
6 On the other hand, migrant children’s
drive and ambition may be promoted by their parents, who may be “positively selected”
in those terms by the decision to migrate in the first place – though the extent to which
parents can effectively transmit such aspirations to their children may depend on the
strength of family structures and vary across groups.
Crul and Vermeulen (2003) presents the findings of another cross-national collaborative
effort, this time focused on Turkish second-generation immigrants in six European
countries (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Austria) and
comparing their outcomes with for example Moroccan immigrants. They make the
important point that “Turks” in different countries cannot automatically be taken as the
same group – there may be significant differences in ethnicity, first-generation education
levels, and religion – but find in fact that the socioeconomic backgrounds of Turkish
labour migrants turn out to be fairly similar in all the receiving countries. This
socioeconomic background is extremely low compared with the native populations of
these countries, and combined with a traditional Muslim background this means that
Turkish immigrants are widely considered to be one of the toughest groups to integrate.
The education level of the first generation immigrants was particularly low, reflecting
their rural subsistence farming background.
For the second generation, major differences across countries in educational trajectories
were found. A much higher proportion of the children of Turkish immigrants are
channelled into a vocational track at lower secondary level in Germany and Austria than
6 Language cannot account for the disadvantage of those from Caribbean ancestry in Britain, and black
resistance to and rejection of schooling, partly in response to racism within the system, has been put
forward as an explanation. However, since test scores for young people of Maghrebian ancestry in France
and of Moroccan, Tunisian or Caribbean ancestry in the Netherlands can be explained without recourse to
such factors, if valid this would need to reflect some features specific to Britain.12
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and far more entered the preparatory track for
higher education in France and Belgium. However, the drop-out rate is also highest in
France, with a much higher proportion leaving secondary school with no diploma at all,
so there is a price to be paid for the high proportion getting to university. Those
channelled into the German and Austrian apprenticeship system also benefit when it
comes to transition into the labour market, as discussed below. One striking finding
reported by Timmerman, Vanderwaeren and Crul (2003) from this project relates to
Belgium: whereas the Walloon region is strongly focused on the French republican model
of integration, the Flemish region is more inspired by the Dutch multicultural model. At
the same time, the education system is the same all over Belgium, and so are the school
achievements of the Turkish second generation. As Crul and Vermeulen (2003) conclude,
“This remarkable outcome is perhaps the most compelling evidence yet that integration
models do not have the impact they are often purported to have” (p. 978). More broadly,
the results of this comparative project do not point to any clear effect of integration
policies that specifically target migrants, but some generic national institutional
arrangements do seem to matter.
Compensatory education programmes aimed at migrants may potentially play an
important role in educational outcomes. Fase (1994), in an analysis of the history of
introduction of such programmes n different European countries, brings out the
differences between them – in terms for example of whether they were integrated into the
school curricula versus separate classes for migrants. Interestingly, though, the
conclusion is drawn that such differences had few consequences for the educational status
of immigrant children in the various countries.
Among the many studies focused on individual countries, it is worth noting Esser (2006),
who provides evidence that language difficulties play a significant role in Turkish
disadvantage in German schools. Language proficiency is even more likely to be an issue
for the “1.5” generation of migrants who arrived during their school years, Kristen (2008)
also focuses on those of Turks background in Germany and explores school choice
processes and how they contribute to ethnic school segregation. The results show that13
Turkish children are more likely than German children to enter a school with a relatively
larger proportion of foreign nationals, a pattern that in the aggregate seems to contribute
to an increasing ethnic separation at the school level. However, rather than originating
from ethnic differences in evaluation or school access, parents’ perception are seen as
primary importance - unfamiliarity with the system means Turkish families frequently
pay attention to only the school that accommodates more foreign nationals.
Such studies and findings shed some light on the question of “what works” for immigrant
youth in education. Identifying the critical role of parental socio-economic background,
and that it operates for second-generation migrants in a generally similar fashion as for
others, clearly has the important implication that institutions and policies that promote
labour market success for the first generation can be expected to have direct effects in
reducing educational disadvantage for their offspring. The structure of the educational
system also matters. The general understanding from studies of social class inequalities in
educational attainment is that early selection is associated with greater inequalities,
whereas educational systems that delay selection are more egalitarian (see e.g. Breen and
Jonsson, 2005). Some countries which have early selection and “tracking” (such as the
Netherlands and Germany) do appear to have relatively high minority disadvantage at age
15. The availability of second chance entry routes make it easier for minorities to
progress (while also benefitting disadvantaged majority youth).
In predominantly comprehensive systems with delayed selection (such as Britain and the
USA), however, particular problems may arise for comprehensive schools in
neighbourhoods with high concentrations of migrants and socio-economic disadvantage,
which may reduce ethnic minority opportunities. Programmes directing additional
resources to such schools, such as the French Zones d’Education Prioritaire which go
back to 1982, may have some impact although evaluation results are mixed.
7
7 While for Heath (2009) ZEPs may reduce disadvantage for ethnic minority students, Bénabou, Kramarz
and Prost (2005) found no impact on student achievement generally.14
The nature and availability of tertiary education also has implications for ethnic
minorities. Countries such as Germany with relatively small tertiary sectors with strong
linkage between school performance and entry have lower ethnic minority participation
than the US system of mass higher education with its relatively loose linkage to school
performance, although ethnic minorities are over-represented in lower-prestige
institutions there (Karen, 2002). Similarly the case of France suggests that educational
systems that allow many majority children into higher education are more accessible to
ethnic minority groups as well – though of course a third-level qualification may then be
less valuable in the labour market.
Crul and Vermeulen (2003) point to factors in national education systems that either
hinder or facilitate the school careers of second-generation Turks. National educational
systems differ in school duration, face-to-face contact hours with teachers, selectivity,
and supplementary help available to children and youth inside and outside school. One
significant difference between countries is in the age education begins, which ranges
from 2
1/
2 in Belgium and France to 6 in Germany and Austria, so second-generation
immigrant children in the former have much greater opportunities to learn the majority
language in that crucial developmental phase. Contact hours are also much lower in
Germany and Austria, and there is more emphasis on homework where help at home may
be scant. School selection is then early, at about 10, which combined with a late start and
limited contact hours puts second-generation students at a particular disadvantage. The
later age of selection facilitates immigrant youth in France and Belgium getting into the
more academic stream, though as already noted many falter in that higher track.
Countries also differ in the extent of special assistance and support provided to youth
with learning problems, and to migrant children in particular, notably language training.
There may be some correlation, with countries that provide extra support for students
generally also devoting more resources to immigrants, and the former may well be more
important. The language problems of the “1.5” generation clearly need to be addressed,
but this is not a panacea and will not solve the problems of the second generation - not
compensating for the impact of differences in starting age, for example. As far as15
language programmes are concerned, there is considerable debate about the best method
for improving proficiency, for example transitional bilingual programmes versus
intensive instruction in the host country language, and integration into mainstream school
programmes versus outside school (see e.g. Westin, 2003).
In concluding this section, it is important to emphasise that policies aimed at improving
school standards generally by increasing parental information and choices may increase
ethnic (and other) inequalities, since minority parents are likely to be less knowledgeable
about the available choices. There fact that minorities may do particularly poorly early on
but the gap tends to close as educational careers progress provides some grounds for
optimism, as well as illustrating the resilience and potential of such groups. This has a
less benign interpretation, however, in that prospects in the labour market may also play a
role: discrimination on entry into the labour market may work to reduce the opportunity
cost for migrant youth of continuing in education (though any subsequent discrimination
reducing the return to a given level of education for migrants will work the other way). In
the current economic environment where unemployment is rising dramatically, the labour
market prospects for immigrant youth may be particularly poor, and it is to employment
and earnings in the labour market that we now turn.
Employment and Earnings
There are many reasons why first generation immigrants might fare badly in the labour
market. Firstly, their foreign qualifications may not be recognised. Secondly, their lack of
language fluency may hinder their opportunities to get desirable jobs. Thirdly, their lack
of experience in the destination labour market may prevent them from getting the kind of
work they would have wanted or were qualified for. However, these reasons will not
apply with the same force to the second generation, among whom we should see reduced
disadvantage. Despite this, a range of studies finds that ethnic minorities are
disadvantaged in the labour market with respect to employment and occupational
attainment. Furthermore, this has been found to reflect but also to go beyond what would
be predicted on the basis of those second-generation immigrants’ own educational
attainment.16
While there have been many informative studies of the employment experiences of
migrants and their earnings vis-a-vis natives, here our main focus is once again on
learning from cross-country studies. Heath and Cheung (2007) report on a collaborative
study by a team of sociologists covering the main Western countries where there have
been large numbers of immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century - including
the classic immigrant countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA, a group of
developed countries in Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Great Britain, and South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland
which can be regarded as 'settler' societies built on migration. They highlight the
importance of distinguishing the gross disadvantages that ethnic minorities typically
experience in the labour market from the net disadvantages, or 'ethnic penalties', after
controlling for educational qualifications and experience in the labour market. A clear
pattern of ethnic stratification is found in each country which continues, although often
with reduced magnitude, in the second generation. The hierarchy is broadly similar, with
groups from North-West European origins at the top, followed by those from other
European countries, with immigrants from non-European origins towards the bottom.
Most groups of non-European ancestry experience substantial ethnic penalties in terms of
unemployment and occupational attainment (having controlled for their education levels),
even in the second and later generations. In a few countries, notably Australia and
Canada, the second generation of European ancestry do not experience any ethnic
penalties while groups of non-European ancestry experience moderate ethnic penalties
but only for employment. Those fortunate enough to be in work get jobs commensurate
with their qualifications. This is also true in the case of Britain, Sweden and the USA. In
contrast, in many western European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands, ethnic penalties are quite substantial for non-European
minorities both with respect to securing employment as well as in gaining access to
salaried jobs. Ethnic minorities in Belgium and France are particularly disadvantaged.
There are a number of possible explanations for greater ethnic penalties being
experienced in Western Europe than in North America or Australia. First of all, the state17
of the labour market, for example, the level of unemployment and the flexibility of the
local labour market, may be responsible. Secondly, prejudice against ethnic minorities
and exclusionary or xenophobic attitudes may also in part explain these cross-national
differences. Finally 'inclusivity', such as the ease of obtaining citizenship, and
'selectivity', such as immigration legislation that restricts entry to highly qualified
migrations, may also explain the different fortunes of ethnic minority groups in western
countries. The largest ethnic penalties, found in Austria, Belgium and Germany, seem to
be a legacy of guest worker programmes in these countries which attracted mostly
immigrants from a rural peasant background.
We have already noted Crul and Vermeulen’s (2003) emphasis on the effectiveness of the
German and Austrian apprenticeship system in ensuring a relatively smooth transition to
work for immigrant youth who follow that track. Strikingly, unemployment among
second-generation Turks in those countries is only one-quarter to one-third as high as in
France, Belgium or the Netherlands. The apprenticeship system seems to give young
people with low vocational diplomas a start on the job market, a step which is much
harder to accomplish in countries without such a system, where absence of work
experience is a severe handicap. France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent the
Netherlands, thus display more polarization: while a substantial group of second-
generation Turks are reaching white-collar or professional positions, many qualified and
unqualified workers suffer serious unemployment as a result of their difficult transition to
the labour market. Of course, the overall level of unemployment in the country is a
critical contextual factor affecting outcomes for migrant youth.
As already noted, there has been a wide range of studies of migrants in individual
countries, notably the USA, Canada, UK, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia,
and these support the conclusion from such comparative studies that while it is essential
to distinguish among different migrant groups and education plays a central role in labour
market outcomes for migrants as for others, some migrant groups experience substantial
and sustained disadvantage in the labour market in terms of time spent unemployed and
earnings when in work. It is unlikely that the disadvantages of migrants in the labour18
market will disappear of their own accord, but what government action will help?
Clearly, improving the educational performance of migrant youth should translate into
better labour market outcomes, so the structural and compensatory issues discussed above
in relation to education are highly relevant. It is also important to note that some labour
market structures have much wider divergence in outcomes between the more versus less
skilled or educated than others: those than are most will also work to the advantage of
migrants with relatively low skills. As in other domains, institutions and policies that
effectively incorporate the disadvantaged, broadly defined, may be at least as important
as ones directed specifically towards migrants.
Going beyond that, though, several other areas appear likely to be potentially important
in narrowing gaps between (some) migrant groups and others in labour market outcomes.
One is the way post-education training, both when aimed at those in work and at re-
integration of the unemployed, is structured, and the extent to which it seeks to meet the
particular needs of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Major advances have been made in
the way the impact of training and re-integration programmes are evaluated, with
increasingly sophisticated statistical methods and use of randomized trials being used.
This research provides a basis for designing more effective intervention, which is all the
more important in the current economic crisis. The same may be said of programmes
aimed at re-generating deprived urban areas, in which disadvantaged ethnic minorities are
often concentrated.
The other area is perhaps the most obvious: discrimination and how to tackle it. Field
studies in various countries have amply demonstrated the existence of substantial
discrimination in hiring that disadvantages visible ethnic minorities (as well as those
living in what are perceived to be areas of concentrated disadvantage, which may also
affect those minorities). Recognising the pervasiveness of discrimination in the labour
market is the first step towards addressing it. Many countries have implemented both
stringent anti-discrimination legislation and education programmes aimed at changing
attitudes (among both employers and employees), which do seem to have an impact;
vigorous implementation on both fronts seems essential if labour market outcomes for19
migrants in particular minority groups are to be improved. A particularly contentious
issue, of course, is whether it is to go further and introduce affirmative action for
minority groups. Heath (2009), for example, points in this context to the example of
Northern Ireland, where the 'Troubles' of the 1970s led to affirmative action policies that
appear to be associated with a gradual reduction in Catholic disadvantage. However,
generalizing from that very specific case seems hazardous, and the conditions under
which affirmative action does more good than harm for ethnic minorities need careful
study.
Economic Resources and Poverty
Disadvantage in the labour market for immigrants translates directly into lower
household income and a heightened risk of poverty. For some, this is compounded by
other risk factors – notably family size and a higher probability of falling through gaps in
the social safety-net, not least due to limited entitlements. Thus a wide variety of national
and comparative studies have found immigrants to have above-average poverty rates and,
often, poverty rates that are higher than otherwise similar individuals and households. As
in other domains, though, immigrants cannot be sensibly seen as a homogenous group,
with a great deal of variation in income and poverty outcomes not only across different
countries of origin but also within ethnic groups.
The USA is unusual in having an official income poverty line, and immigrants are much
more likely to be below that line than native U.S. citizens (based on annual income in the
previous year). The poverty rate for immigrants and their U.S.-born children is two-thirds
higher than that of natives, and as a consequence immigrants and their children account
for almost one in four persons living in poverty. Recent immigrants have a particularly
high poverty rate, over twice that of U.S. natives, with a much lower rate for those who
entered in for example the 1970s or 1980s. There is an enormous variation in poverty
rates among immigrants from different countries, with those from for example Mexico or
the Dominican Republic having much higher rates than those from Poland or the
Philippines. Trends over time also vary across these groups and with date of arrival,
though it is noteworthy that during the “Clinton boom” of the 1990s the poverty rates of
recent immigrants fell about four times as fast as for U.S. natives. In Canada, immigrants20
are consistently over-represented among the poor, their poverty rates are particularly high
in larger cities which have larger concentrations of immigrants, and poverty rates are
particularly high for visible minorities, who are mostly recent immigrants (Kazemipur
and Halli, 2001). The poverty rate for recent immigrants of working age is more than
twice that of native-born Canadians, though migrants who have been in Canada for
longer have poverty rates close to those of the native-born (Fleury, 2007). Recent
immigrants are over-represented among both working poor and non-working poor.
Different studies have produced different findings in relation to second-generation
migrants, with some suggesting that they have not improved on the poverty rates of the
first generation and others that they have done much better.
8
In Europe, above-average poverty risk for immigrants has been frequently noted across a
wide range of countries. As comparative data from EU-SILC becomes available, it is now
also possible to carry out more soundly-based comparisons of immigrants’ economic
status across EU countries, though there are still problems in doing so in sufficient depth.
Migrants can be distinguished as persons born outside their current country of residence,
or not citizens of that country – the latter comprising a smaller group. On the basis of data
for fourteen countries from the first round of EU-SILC in 2004, Lelkes (2007) shows that
with either definition migrants have higher poverty rates
9 than others in most of those
countries (though Portugal is an exception). However, the gap varies a great deal from
one country to another, and also between migrants from other EU countries versus those
from outside the EU (the only information about country of origin obtained). Migrants
from other EU countries consistently have lower poverty rates than those from outside
the EU, and in certain countries (including Portugal, Greece and Ireland) their poverty
rates are no higher than the native population. Those from outside the EU face very much
higher poverty rates than others most countries, with the gap being particularly wide in
for example Denmark, Sweden, France and Belgium. While EU-SILC has significant
potential in further exploring the situation of migrants in Europe and how this varies
across countries, it is a major limitation that country of origin is not known.
8 See for example Kazemipur and Halli’s (2001) negative findings but Boyd’s (1998) more positive ones.
9 Poverty in this case is measured vis-à-vis relative income poverty thresholds set at 60% of median income
in the country in question, the most widely-used approach in Europe.21
Excess poverty for immigrants clearly reflects a number of distinct but inter-related
factors, most importantly lower education and disadvantage in the labour market as
already discussed, as well as family size and structure. When education and labour force
status (as well as age and gender) are taken into account, though, migrants as a group are
still seen to face an excess poverty risk. In the EU, for example, the EU-SILC study by
Lelkes finds that migrants have a poverty risk that is 6-15% higher than others with
similar characteristics, depending on how migrants are distinguished. (The number of
migrants in the sample does not allow differences across countries in this respect to be
robustly estimated.)
As well as lower earnings and higher unemployment/inactivity rates, the higher poverty
rate for immigrants may reflect inadequacies and gaps in social security structures, both
ones that apply generally and ones that are specific to immigrants. Migrants may be
particularly likely to find themselves relying on safety-net schemes, while differential
access/rights in relation to income support may leave some migrants without support or
with lower levels than a native in the same circumstances would receive.
What can be done to address the high poverty rates, and limited economic resources more
broadly, that face significant groups of immigrants? The key areas for policy certainly
include seeking to promoting economic success via education and labour market policies
along the lines discussed above. These are the classic responses of liberal market
economies to disadvantage: improve earnings capacity so that people can become self-
sufficient. However, it is also clear from extensive comparative research on poverty that
welfare state structures, and the social protection system in particular, also play a central
role. Thus financial and other supports for families, in addition to employment and
earnings, have been seen to be key components of “what works” for child poverty
generally.
10 Such supportive frameworks would be particularly important for immigrant
families, but some further measures targeted specifically at them also have a role. This
could include, for example, seeking to ensure that immigrants have the information
10 See Addema and Whiteford (2007), UNICEF (2007), European Commission (2008)22
required to avail of their entitlements and that factors underlying non-take-up of benefits
are addressed. The position of immigrants with limited entitlements – either because they
are illegally present or because entitlements are limited for non-citizens or in other ways
that affect legal immigrants – also needs to be addressed, but there are often perceived to
be political obstacles to more generous treatment by the social welfare system.
Health
The health and health services utilisation and needs of first- and second-generation
immigrants has been the topic of a very substantial research literature, though much of
that literature is focused on very specific migrant groups, conditions and locations, from
which it is difficult to draw any more general conclusions. As Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig
and Smith (2004) point out, the ethnic health disparities observed at any point in time
reflect the average healthiness of the original immigrants and the diversity among them,
and the health trajectories following immigration and also of subsequent generations. A
typical though by no means uniform or consistent pattern is for the first generation to
display better health on average than the population of the host country, but for
substantial convergence to have taken place by the second generation. Much of this
literature relates to the USA and Canada, and takes as point of departure the observation
that the foreign-born population there have much lower rates of chronic conditions than
the native born, across a wide range of different conditions.
11 (It is worth noting that this
is particularly pronounced in the younger age groups, with some evidence of a reversal
among older households, and that there is considerable variation across migrant groups.)
The gap in some other immigrant-receiving countries is in the other direction, though,
with the main immigrant groups in for example The Netherlands having significantly
worse health on various indicators than the native-born population. There is clearly
substantial variation in health across different immigrant groups within and across
countries, and as in other areas it is not appropriate to treat immigrants as a homogenous
group.
11 See for example Jasso et al (2004), Singh and Miller (2004), McDonald and Kennedy (2004).23
Health selectivity of migrants – the “healthy migrant” effect – clearly plays an important
role in producing the North American pattern, and this has been a very important theme
in the research literature.
12 Another important theme is the use of migrants in order to
identify the role of environment, by comparison of health among migrants with others in
the sending and receiving country (with Japanese in the USA a much-cited example). A
third is the role of culture, and in particular whether some immigrant groups benefit from
cultural norms (for example in relation to diet and risky behaviours) that serve as a
protective factor for health, with this buffering generally reducing from one generation to
the next. Finally, the act of immigration may itself directly affect health, since it may be
stressful with negative psychosocial impacts, potentially impacting on for example heart
disease.
Focusing on children and youth, US research also suggests that those in immigrant
families have fewer specific acute and chronic health problems, as well as lower
prevalence of accidents and injuries. Rates of low birthweight and infant mortality are
also lower among children born to immigrant women than to US-born women, despite
their lower socioeconomic status. Among adolescents, overall immigrants are less likely
than US-born youth to consider themselves in poor health or have school absences due to
health or emotional problems. First-generation immigrant adolescents are also less likely
to report that they engage in risky behaviours. However, this is less true of the second
generation and by the third and later generations risky behaviours approach or exceed
US-born white adolescents. Adolescents in immigrant families appear to experience
overall levels of psychological well-being and self-esteem that are similar to, if not better
than, adolescents in US-born families, but the former do report feeling less control over
their own lives (Hernandez and Charney, 1998). So high levels of poverty and other
socioeconomic and demographic risk factors for children in immigrant families do not
always lead to the negative outcomes overall that might be expected.
12 This may sometimes be reinforced by a further selection of the healthy among migrants, for example
Mexican immigrants who return to Mexico may be less healthy than those who stay in the USA.24
There are also many reasons why immigrants, and children of immigrants, might be
distinctive in terms of access to and utilisation of health services. Specific patterns of
healthcare use may be observed among recent immigrants in particular, with greater
reliance on “walk-in” services such as accident and emergency departments rather than
regular primary care providers.
13 The most obvious factor distinguishing some
immigrants is that they do not have the same entitlement to health services as others.
Illegal/undocumented immigrants are most likely to be in this situation, but it may also be
the case for refugees and asylum seekers, recent migrants who have not yet established
residence, and sometimes other migrants depending on the intricacies of how entitlement
is framed. Even where their legal entitlement is the same as the native-born, immigrants
may be more likely to be uninsured is systems where health insurance plays an important
role. Apart from entitlement, a range of other considerations may also influence
immigrants’ use of health services, and once again this continues to be the subject of a
substantive research literature. Those who have limited proficiency in the language of the
host country face particular barriers in accessing services, but lack of knowledge about
what is available and appropriate, and of the social support networks that help in
acquiring it, may handicap others. Discrimination on the part of service providers could
also be at work, either overtly or in the implicit assumption that the “alien” culture is
inferior and the patient’s behaviour inappropriate.
In terms of access, the situation of undocumented immigrants is a clear concern and
different countries have responded in different ways – not always in a positive direction.
(Welfare reform in the USA in 1996 greatly restricted the provision of many federal, state
and local publicly-funded services to the undocumented.) Undocumented immigrants are
often distinctive (from other migrants and the native-born) in health status and needs, for
example in terms of prevalence of communicable disease and immunizations on arrival
and the conditions in which they then live and work. Limited access to health services
and unwillingness to use them can then exacerbate the problem, with obvious risks not
just to the immigrants themselves but in public health terms to the broader community.
There may be an important distinction between policy and practice, with care actually
13 See for example Leduc and Proulx (2004).25
being provided on the basis of need as presented even where the rules say otherwise (see
for example Kullgren, 2003), but this can hardly be regarded as satisfactory – apart from
anything else, in the ethical dilemmas it creates for providers.
Some first-generation immigrant youth face particular health challenges, with refugees
and asylum seekers and youth migrating without their families the most obvious
examples. The situations from which they have come in their country of origin may have
traumatic effects on psychological well-being, while migration itself and the conditions in
which they are often forced to live in the receiving country while their legal situation is
clarified are often additional stressors. Therapeutic interventions may well be required to
meet immediate mental health needs, and in the longer term specially-designed mental
health services may also be required (see for example Pumariega et al, 2005).
For second-generation immigrant youth, the issue of acculturation and its potential
impact on health is of particular salience. While much discussed and investigated, the
way in which key variables are measured varies so much from one study to another that it
is very difficult to draw broad conclusions. As Salant and Lauderdale (2003) bring out,
the way acculturation is conceptualised and measured in the research literature is both
highly variable and open to criticism, with efforts to reduce such a complex phenomenon
to a single measure (such as language spoken) or scale particularly questionable.
More generally, meaningful conclusions about the circumstances and causal processes
affecting first and second-generation immigrants, and children and youth in particular,
require first their identification in general samples of the population large enough to
support statistical inference, distinguished by ethnic group or origin; they then require
that both the factors relevant to healthy development for everyone, and the specific
factors in relation to migrant experience, context and culture that may be relevant to
health, be measured. This is a tall order, and so it is not surprising that rigorous
comparative studies – where all this has to be available across a number of countries, and
with the variables measured in the same way – are rare. Most look at specific conditions,
often with small samples or relying on administrative data, and make inferences without26
being able to control adequate for the composition of the populations involved or other
factors.
Bollini and Siem (1995) for example look at the entitlements of migrants in a range of
developed countries, and then at perinatal/infant mortality and the frequency of
occupational accidents and disability distinguishing various ethnic groupings (which
differ from one country to the next), together with research on these outcomes. They
point to the importance of controlling for social class but the studies on which they rely
may or may not have done so adequately. Thus, while they argue for the importance of
differences in entitlement, it is unclear how much weight can be placed on that. It is of
interest, nonetheless, that two broad categories of countries are distinguished in terms of
attitude to health care provision for migrants:
 Those displaying a “passive” attitude, in which migrants are expected to make use
of the existing health system without any major modification or the provision of
special programmes and services; and
 Those with an “active” attitude, in which the special health needs of immigrant
communities are acknowledged and steps are taken to minimize linguistic and
cultural barriers, by organizing specific services for different ethnic groups, and
by organisational changes within mainstream services to accommodate ethnic
diversity.
It is argued (see also Bollini, 1993) that an active attitude, translated into the adoption of
a specific health policy for migrants and ethnic minorities, could remove many economic,
administrative and linguistic barriers to access to health care – while acknowledging that
it is not clear (at an overall level) how much impact such policies have on differences in
health outcomes. [some tentative inferences can be drawn from cross-country
comparisons, even without having been able to control adequately for differences in the
characteristics of the immigrants themselves] While in the USA recent immigrants seem
much less likely to receive timely health care than others, in Canada there seems to be
relatively little difference between the health services utilisation patterns of immigrants
and native-born, and that any differences for recently-arrived migrants disappear quite
quickly (see for example Gluberman, 1998, Laroche, 2000, McDonald and Kennedy,27
2004). Even in the USA, it is noteworthy that for those who have been in the country for
10 years or more, any remaining differences have been found to be attributable (at least in
statistical terms) to age at immigration and language used. In The Netherlands, to take
another example, the health care system contains few financial barriers, and both
quantitative and qualitative studies have shown that the accessibility of curative health
care for the main immigrant groups (including Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese) is
high. Nonetheless, studies conclude that it is likely that even there, due to cultural and
communications barriers migrants benefit less from health services than most indigenous
patients.
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In terms of what makes a difference in the domain of health for migrants and migrant
youth in particular, then, key considerations are:
1) The structure of health care and its accessibility for the general population,
especially the poor and disadvantaged;
2) The entitlements of different types of immigrant, including the undocumented in
particular;
3) The extent to which special provision is made, within and alongside mainstream
services, for the special needs of particular immigrant communities. These may be
nested within broader programmes targeting disadvantage (poor urban areas, for
example), or aimed at health conditions that are particularly prevalent in specific
migrant groups (such as infectious diseases).
4) The extent to which the needs of specific types of immigrants such as refugees
and asylum seekers are met by the provision of specially-designed and culturally
and therapeutically appropriate services.
As well as thinking about policies and institutions that “work” in terms of improving
immigrant health, it is worth noting that the evidence on immigrant health has
implications for policy in relation to immigration itself. A common theme in popular
debate is that immigrants represent a “burden” on the health services of the host country,
and this feeds into demands for restricting access to those services (as recently seen in the
14 Venema, Garretsen and van der Maas, (1995)28
UK, for example).
15 The fact that immigrants are on average healthier is an important
point that often gets lost in this debate, but does not always effectively counter the
argument for screening and selecting migrants explicitly on the basis of health status.
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Housing and Physical Environment
There is a large amount of research which demonstrates that the housing experiences (in
terms of housing choice, quality, affordability and location) of recent immigrants are
generally, though not uniformly, worse that those of the native population, and for certain
ethnic groups this can persist over several generations.
17 Finding a suitable place to live is
the first step towards successful integration, but immigrants face specific disadvantages
in accessing adequate housing, in addition to those associated with socio-economic
status; these have potentially serious implications for the second generation. Over and
above the constraints imposed by their often limited financial resources, finding
appropriate housing may be made more difficult for the first generation by lack of
knowledge, high housing costs in the urban areas where migrants often concentrate,
shortage of suitable housing (especially for rental), and discriminatory practices by
landlords and sellers. Immigrants frequently report serious problems in accessing
housing, and may have to devote a high proportion of their incomes to meeting housing
costs. At the extreme, immigrants (and especially refugees) may be particularly
vulnerable to homelessness.
18
For the second generation, rather than access per se the more salient issues are the quality
of housing and the neighbourhood in which it is set. While many immigrant families do
manage to move up the housing ladder, spatial concentration is common – reflecting
reliance on ethnic ties for information and other advantages of co-location, as well as
15 “East European immigrants with cancer 'could swamp the NHS'” is an example of the newspaper
headlines generated by this issue.
16 The Conservative Party in Britain, for example, promised in 2005 to introduce mandatory HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis testing for prospective immigrants
17 For example, Carter (2005) reports that in Canada immigrants are likely to be in housing need; Harrison
(2005) reports that in the United Kingdom ethnic minority households are significantly more live in
overcrowded housing than is the rest of the population.
18 Harvey (1994) for example estimated that 10-20% of homeless persons in the EU were migrants or
refugees; see also Carter (2005), Harrison (2005), Edgar et al, 2004.29
discrimination in the housing market. Spatial polarisation along ethnic lines has been a
major preoccupation in the USA, and also in the UK, and to a lesser extent in for example
The Netherlands and Sweden (Harrison, 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998). While it is
not always the case that these neighbourhoods are relatively deprived, that is also
common, adding another potential layer of neighbourhood effects to those associated
with ethnic concentration. Housing and housing policy are thus potentially critical for the
environment in which the second generation of immigrant youth grow up.
It is important not to overstate the extent of such immigrant polarisation generally or its
impact.
19 The negative socio-economic effects (on e.g. unemployment, income and
poverty) often assumed to flow from living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood are often
difficult to pin down statistically. This is because it is very hard to be sure one has
adequately controlled for individual and family characteristics and for the implications of
selection/sorting by area, including in terms of characteristics that are very difficult to
capture empirically such as effort and ambition. (There are of course similar difficulties
in estimating the effects of migration itself on such outcomes). Furthermore, the impact
of living in an ethnic enclave may not be unambiguously negative. A substantial US
research literature does link living in segregated areas with poorer employment and
earnings prospects for blacks, (see for example Cutler and Glaeser, 1997), reflecting inter
alia the migration of jobs from inner-city to outer suburbs (the “spatial mismatch”
hypothesis). However, living in an enclave may also have advantages in accessing jobs: a
valuable Swedish study was able to take advantage of a natural experiment whereby
government policy shifted to distribute refugee immigrants across areas, and concluded
that when sorting is taken into account, living in enclaves actually improves labour
market outcomes (Edin et al, 2000). This result – like the others – may not be
generalisable to other immigrant groups and contexts, but serves as a cautionary note in
thinking about ethnic “enclaves”.
19 For example, Musterd and Deurloo (2002) stress that ethnic concentrations in the Netherlands are
relatively small especially when compared to US cities and generally contain a mix of minority ethnic
groups and a sizeable native Dutch component, whereas in the USA they are often overwhelmingly
dominated by the single ethnic community.30
Housing market structures and policies vary widely across countries, most obviously in
the extent of owner occupation but also in the way the state intervenes to assist low-
income households in particular. Studies such as Musterd and Ostendorf (1998) conclude
that in countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, where government spending on
housing and social security are high, minority ethnic populations are likely to be less
excluded than in the UK where levels of public investment in housing and social security
are lower (and the extent of spatial segregation may be less). So improving social housing
provision and other measures to meet the housing needs of low income households
generally are of central importance for immigrants. In the same vein, broadly focused
neighbourhood renewal policies which help to combat the development of stigmatised
low income urban districts may be very important for immigrant youth in particular
though not targeted specifically at them.
Going beyond that, though, the evidence suggests an important role for measures targeted
specifically at immigrants and ethnic minorities to include
 Improving access of recent immigrants in particular to rental or social housing;
 Improving the restricted access to rights for some migrants which is an important
factor in their poorer housing conditions (Edgar et al 2004);
 Encouraging the development of mixed tenure estates;
 Implementing anti-discrimination legislation and procedures in rented and social
housing; and
 Encouraging and facilitating the involvement of minority groups in the
management and provision of social housing
Finally, policy with respect spatial settlement of immigrants is linked to broader debates
both about social mixing between the social classes, and also about how the goals of
social policy in terms of integration or assimilation are framed to which we return briefly
below.31
Family and Peer Relationships, Social Integration and Cohesion
While widely recognised as central to the well-being of youth, it is commonly the case
that quantitative indicators of family and peer relationships, social participation and
integration are much sparser than for the other domains discussed above. For migrant
youth this may be particularly important, since they face challenges over and above those
of other young people, but for the most part the available studies relate to specific
countries, and often specific migrant or ethnic groups. Some are even more specific in
relating to types of immigrants with very particular problems – such as refuges and
asylum seekers or unaccompanied minors. It is clear that exposure to traumatic
conditions prior to migration, coupled with difficulties in acculturation in a new
environment, can lead to severe psychological and behavioural problems.
20 More
generally, though, even without such exposure migration itself is often a stressor, and the
different pace of acculturation of first-generation migrants and their children in the
destination country – with the children usually doing so more rapidly - can put a strain on
family relationships (see for example the review by Suarez-Oroxco and Qin, 2006).
Research has explored the ways in which immigration can lead to family roles being re-
negotiated, which can be associated with stress and discord. This can include a change in
power relationships and the role of women outside the household, which may conflict
with patriarchal expectations on the part of men. Lack of language proficiency among
parents may mean children and youth take on responsibilities for dealing with the outside
world, and the division of work within the household may also be a source of strain
(impacting differently on young men versus women). Parental efforts to exercise
discipline over their children, particularly where the host society is seen as a threat to
their native culture, may be a source of conflict. This may centre on risky or problem
behaviours in the case of boys, but on patterns of socialising for girls. “Dissonant
acculturation” between parents and children can lead to serious problems within the
family. It is important to note, though, that “problem cases” may be more visible to
researchers and those providing social and health services support, giving rise to a
20 See for example Hyman, Vu and Belser’s (2000) study of young people in Southeast Asian refugee
families who resettled in Canada, and McKelvey and Webb’s (1995) study of unaccompanied minors
migrating from Vietnam to the USA.32
tendency to over-estimate the scale of such difficulties among immigrants relative to
others.
21
Immigrant youth may find forming a coherent identity during adolescence particularly
challenging if they have to inhabit different worlds at home and in school, with potential
cultural dissonance, and this may be exacerbated by discrimination and negative images
of their ethnic group in the dominant culture. A variety of sources in the host society,
including school, media, and police, may convey messages about such negative
stereotypes, affecting the individual’s sense of self-worth – with important differences
between young men and women, and across different ethnic groups. Conflicting
messages from home versus school may also pose problems in identity formation,
particularly for girls. It appears that the ability to move easily across cultural contexts –
rather than rapidly leaving behind their culture of origin – is the most adaptive for
immigrant youth’s development (see for example Portes and Zhou, 1993).
Despite the particular challenges that they face, international research on migrant
adaptation suggests that children and young people from immigrant backgrounds
generally show satisfactory levels of psychological and social adjustment; indeed, some
studies have shown them to be less involved in negative behaviours than their national
peers and having at least as high levels of psychological well-being – an aspect of the
“immigrant paradox”. There have been many studies by psychologists and sociologists
focused on the development of immigrant youth from different backgrounds and in
different countries and settings, and it is clear that institutions and attitudes in the host
country matter: patterns of identity, language and value retention, for example, are
influenced by the social and political context, including perceived discrimination and fear
of assimilation (Ward, 2008). However, more rigorous cross-country studies with
standardised approaches and measures are needed to clarify the causal processes and key
influences at work. The International Comparative Study of Ethno-Cultural Youth
organised in 13 immigration-receiving countries, for example, suggests that first
21 A comparison of Mexican immigrant and white Americans by Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, 1995,
for example, found that immigrant and second-generation youth displayed less family conflict than their
white counterparts.33
generation migrant youth were generally equal to or better than their non-migrant peers in
psychological well-being (life satisfaction, self-esteem, mental health) and school
adjustment and behaviour; second-generation youth were largely indistinguishable from
their national peers except for example in New Zealand, where they reported better
school adjustment and fewer behavioural problems. (Berry, Phinney, Sam and Vedder,
2006; Sam, Vedder, Ward and Horenczyk, 2006; Ward, 2008). The strong policy
conclusion presented by the authors, that integration is the best orientation for immigrants
in terms of psychological and socio-cultural adaptation and should be promoted by public
policy, can be questioned – not least on the basis of methodological concerns about the
measurement of acculturation (see Rudmin, 2009) - but the conclusion that discrimination
experiences diminish well-being and should be discouraged by policies and by law seems
harder to dispute.
So it is particularly difficult at this stage to identify institutional settings and policies that
promote wellbeing of immigrant youth in the domain of family and peer relationships,
despite many valuable studies in specific contexts and settings. More open and less
discriminatory attitudes and practices in the host country may be important in facilitating
adaptation by immigrant youth, but it not easy to pin down their precise role, much less
how policy might best be directed to bring about change.
Conclusions
Institutional settings and policies in relation to immigrants and to more broadly vary
greatly across industrialised countries, so comparative analysis can seek to identify which
settings and policies are most effective in promoting the well-being of immigrant youth.
This paper first highlighted the need for an analytical framework for such an exercise,
and pointed towards recent studies and monitoring procedures in relation to well-being,
social inclusion/exclusion, and child well-being. Critically, the focus on well-being
represents a shift away from a one-dimensional focus on a particular aspect of
development or socio-economic circumstances towards a more encompassing concept,
which incorporates a range of dimensions key to a rounded human life. The paper then
sought to place some key findings from the disparate social science research literature on34
immigration and youth within that framework, dealing in turn with the domains of
education, employment and earnings, economic resources and poverty, housing, and
family and peer relationships and integration.
It was made clear from the outset that learning from diversity through such a comparative
perspective faces serious challenges, both in general and especially in studying “what
works” for migrants and migrant youth. To be able to assess which institutional settings
and policies are most effective, one needs to look at how similar immigrants fare in
different countries, but that is very demanding in terms of information, in relation to
institutions and policies, to outcomes, and perhaps most importantly to the migrants
themselves and their backgrounds. If there is one clear lesson from the extensive research
literature on how migrants fare, it is that treating them as a homogenous group is likely to
be highly misleading – and even taking a specific group such as “Turks” may mask
significant differences in composition from one country to another.. What counts as
“doing well” also needs careful consideration – a focus on how migrant youth are doing
in terms of key outcomes in one country versus another could give quite different
answers to one on the “migrant/ethnic penalty”, that is the gap in outcomes between
migrant or ethnic youth and otherwise similar non-migrant youth.
While the paper goes into some detail in reviewing findings across the various domains
covered, in concluding are there general conclusions that may be tentatively advanced
across them? In discussing educational outcomes in particular depth, it was concluded
that traditional explanations emphasizing social background work rather well in
explaining ethnic minority disadvantage, and that targeted programmes aimed at migrants
do not appear to be responsible for much of the difference in outcomes for migrant youth
across countries, with the way the education system is structured in the first place being
much more important. This broad conclusion may perhaps hold across other domains as
well, though the comparative research available to support it is less well-developed.
Structures that are unfavourable for the disadvantaged are also likely to handicap many
immigrants, and strategies to improve the situation of those with limited educational and
skills – for example directing resources towards schools in deprived neighbourhoods or35
towards re-training and re-integration of the unemployed - will also benefit ethnic
minorities without targeting them explicitly.
Structures and policies that work for the disadvantaged generally are likely to be most
accommodating to second-generation immigrants, but first generation migrants (and the
“1.5” generation) may still face particular obstacles across the various domains, due for
example to limited entitlements to social protection and to language and other socio-
economic and cultural barriers to integration. This provides a clear rationale for targeted
support in language acquisition and schooling, for health and social services directed
towards the special needs of migrants and aimed at promoting and facilitating appropriate
utilisation patterns, and for housing policies that prioritise access of recent migrants to
rental or social housing.
While targeted support and policies are still relevant for some second-generation migrant
youth, anti-discrimination policies may be at least as important. Recognising the
pervasiveness of discrimination in the labour market is the first step towards addressing
it. Many countries have implemented both stringent anti-discrimination legislation and
education programmes aimed at changing attitudes, and vigorous implementation on both
fronts seems essential if outcomes for migrants from particular minority groups are to be
improved. Whether to go further in the direction of affirmative action is inevitably
contentious, and the conditions under which affirmative action does more good than harm
for ethnic minorities need careful study.
There is a significant literature on the immigration policy of developed countries focused
on how many are admitted and on what basis, including in Europe at EU level, which we
have not discussed here (see for example Sainsbury, 2006). As well as how welfare states
are structured and treat people generally, and how extensive and effective specific
policies aimed at migrants are, it seems likely that policies in relation to which migrants
to accept and how illegal entrants are treated play a central role in determining the
observed variation in outcomes for migrants across countries. However, one would wish36
for a much clearer view of the relationship between immigration policy and how
immigrants fare.
We may conclude with the major gaps in our knowledge more generally, and what is
needed to make progress in learning from disparate country experiences about how best
to promote the well-being of immigrant youth. Our discussion across the various domains
brings out that arriving at meaningful conclusions about the circumstances and causal
processes affecting first and second-generation immigrants, and youth in particular, is
very demanding in terms of data. It requires first that first and second-generation
migrants be identified in general samples of the population large enough to support
statistical inference, distinguished by ethnic group or origin. It requires that key outcomes
be measured in a reliable and comprehensive fashion. Finally, both the factors
hypothesised to affect those outcomes for everyone, and the specific factors in relation to
migrant experience, context and culture, need be measured. This is a tall order, and so it
is not surprising that rigorous comparative studies – where all this has to be available
across a number of countries, and with the variables measured in the same way – have
only begun to emerge in recent years. They demonstrate both the resources and time that
must be devoted to getting such comparative studies right, and the benefits of doing so:
they now provide us with a template for similar studies within the various domains and
across them in the future.37
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